The ABL rule is derived as a tool of standard quantum mechanics. The ontological significance of the existence of objective probabilities is dis- 
INTRODUCTION
Following Mermin [1] , I have characterized some of the probabilities that quantum mechanics allows us to calculate as being objective in the sense that they have nothing to do with ignorance-there is nothing for us to be ignorant of [2] . I have argued that the objective probabilities associated with attributions of results to unperformed measurements should be calculated according to the ABL rule, first derived by Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz [3] . Ruth Kastner [4, 5, 6] and others [7, 8, 9] have raised objections concerning the appropriateness of probability assignments to counterfactuals based on the ABL rule. In the present article I re-derive the ABL rule, clarify the meaning of objective probabilities and the significance of their existence, and respond to these objections.
In Sec. 2 both the Born rule and the ABL rule are derived from the standard, quantum-mechanical representation of contingent properties [10] as projection operators on a Hilbert space. Section 3 refutes the objections by Kastner and the other authors to counterfactual uses of the ABL rule. Section 4 elucidates the significance of the existence of objective probabilities, and Section 5 is devoted to unearthing unwarranted metaphysical presumptions leading to such views as Kastner is defending in her Comment [4] .
OBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES AND THE ABL RULE
Quantum mechanics is unequivocal about the probabilities it assigns to the possible results of possible measurements. If we represent the potentially attributable [11] properties of a system as projection operators on a Hilbert space H, there is no ambiguity as to the form of the prior probability measure p (q i , t), which is based solely on properties possessed by the system before the time t [12, 13, 14] :
As is well known, W is a unique density operator [that is, a unique self-adjoint, positive operator satisfying Tr(W) = 1 and W 2 ≤ W]. Tr signifies the trace defined by the formula Tr(X) := i i|X|i for any orthonormal basis {|i } in H. If W 2 = W, W(t) projects on a one-dimensional subspace of H and thus is equivalent-apart from an irrelevant phase factor-to a "state" vector |ψ(t) . Such a "state" is said to be "pure," and the system is said to be "prepared" in it. With W(t) = |ψ(t) ψ(t)| and P q i = |q i q i |, we obtain the familiar Born rule:
p (q i , t) = Tr[|ψ(t) ψ(t)|P q i ] = ψ(t)|P q i |ψ(t) = | ψ(t)|q i | 2 .
Applying the Born rule twice, we obtain the prior probability that a system with a prior probability measure |a a| will first be observed to have the property |q i q i | and then be found in possession of the property |b b|:
(For simplicity's sake we will assume that the Hamiltonian is zero between measurements.) Although readers familiar with the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics are not likely to stumble over this expression, it involves a conceptual transition that needs to be justified. When we ask for the probability that q i , given a, the projection operator |q i q i | represents a potentially attributable property of the system. When we ask for the probability that b, given q i , the same operator represents a probability measure. How do we get from a property to a probability measure?
If we start out with a probability measure W 1 = |a a| and then find that the system has the property P, we must update our probability measure accordingly.
If the measurement that yields the property P is ideal-as is generally assumed when discussing interpretational issues,-the updated probability measure assigns probability zero to any property P ′ for which PP ′ = 0. Hence the "state" of the system "collapses"-not mysteriously but self-evidently-to the "state"
The denominator ensures that the probability of the trivial property, represented by the identity operator 1, remains 1. If we put |q i q i | in place of P, this reduces to W 2 = |q i q i |. Thus the updated probability measure is represented by the same operator as the property observed [15] .
Next, we consider the probability that a system with a prior probability measure |a a| will be found in possession of property |b b| given that in the meantime Q is measured but regardless of the result of this measurement. This is obviously the sum of probabilities
According to Bayes' theorem, the probability that the intervening measurement yields q i given that the prior probability measure is |a a| and given that the final measurement yields b, then is
This is (one of the possible forms of) the ABL rule. Like the Born rule, it follows straight from the quantum-mechanical representation of contingent properties as projection operators on a Hilbert space.
In principle, both rules have an objective as well as a subjective application. If Q is actually measured, both rules assign probabilities that are subjective inasmuch as they are based on probability measures that fail to take account of at least one relevant fact-the result of the measurement of Q. In order to be considered objective, a quantum-mechanical probability must be assigned on the basis of all relevant facts. If the Q measurement is actually made, the objective probabilities associated with its possible outcomes are trivially either zero or one. Thus both rules can assign nontrivial objective probabilities only if the Q measurement is not made. But this is not sufficient. Since Born probabilities take no account of (future) facts about the system's future properties, they can be considered objective only if there are no relevant such facts. This is hardly ever the case. Hence, in general, objective probabilities are calculated according to the ABL rule. We can drop the qualifying "in general" if we use the trivial property in place of |b b| if there never will be any facts about the system's future properties. In this case the ABL rule reduces to the Born rule:
Thus objective probabilities are calculated according to the ABL rule, and they are assigned to contrary-to-fact conditionals, or counterfactuals, of the following general form:
(A) If a measurement of observable Q were performed on system S between an actual measurement yielding the result |a a| at time t a and an actual measurement yielding the result |b b| at time t b , but no measurement is actually performed between t a and t b , then the measurement of Q would yield q i with probability p (q i |a, b).
For p (q i |a, b) to be objective, it is not enough that Q is not actually measured; it is necessary that no measurement is performed between t a and t b . If any other measurement M is performed during this time span, p (q i |a, b) is based on an incomplete set of facts-it does not take account of the result of M-and is therefore subjective.
Note that the antecedent clause states not only that the Q measurement is made (counterfactually or in a possible world) but also that at the times t a and t b the respective results |a a| and |b b| are obtained (that is, they are as in the actual world). The observation that the result obtained at t b might have been different had the Q measurement been actually made, is irrelevant to the truth of (A) inasmuch as it is based on an incomplete set of facts-it does not take into account the result obtained at t b -while statement (A) is based on a complete set of facts, as it must be in order to assign objective probabilities. Probabilities are objective only if they are assigned to unperformed measurements, and only if the assignment is based on all relevant facts. The second "if" translates into the strong ceteris paribus clause that all measurement results obtained in the actual world are also obtained in the possible worlds considered by (A). These possible worlds differ from the actual world only in that they contain one extra measurement that is not made in the actual world.
REPLY TO KASTNER
Ruth Kastner [4, 5, 6] and others [7, 8, 9] have raised objections concerning the appropriateness of probability assignments to counterfactuals based on the ABL rule. The first objection I will address is this [6] : Since the Q measurement is not actually made, the following rule should be used instead of the ABL rule (6):
This rule combines, according to Bayes' theorem, the probability p (q i , b|a) that a system with a prior probability measure |a a| will first be observed to have property |q i q i | and then be found in possession of property |b b|, with the probability p (b|a) that an equally "prepared" [16] system will be observed to have property |b b| given that in the meantime no measurement is made. In the numerator Kastner assumes that Q is measured, and in the denominator she assumes that between t a and t b no measurement takes place. Whereas in the denominator of the ABL rule (6) probabilities are added-the Q measurement is assumed to be made,-in the denominator of Kastner's rule (8) amplitudes are added, which entails that the Q measurement is not made. The ABL rule thus is consistent-it assumes throughout that the Q measurement is made,-while the same cannot be said of Kastner's rule.
A similar inconsistency mars arguments by Sharp and Shanks [7] , Cohen [8] ,
Miller [9] , and Kastner [5, 6] purporting to prove the general invalidity of counterfactual uses of the ABL rule. These arguments have been refuted-cogently, in my opinion-by Vaidman [17] , though Kastner [18] , predictably, takes a different view.
What these "proofs" purport to show is that the counterfactual use of the ABL rule yields results that are inconsistent with standard quantum mechanics. Specifically, it is claimed that this use entails the following equation:
Since the final measurement of the observable B, assumed to have two eigenvalues b 1 and b 2 , is actually made, the Born probability p (q j |a) of the outcome q j of an intermediate measurement of Q is uncontroversially the sum of the probabilities p (q j , b 1 |a) and p (q j , b 2 |a). According to eq. (9) this is not always the case. It is the case if
This holds if Q = A (the observable measured at time t a ) or Q = B, or if for j = k,
Kastner states these conditions in Refs. [5] and [6] . It is then argued that since the counterfactual use of the ABL rule in eq. (9) [which would ensure that p (q j |a) = p (q j , b 1 |a) + p (q j , b 2 |a)] since the probabilities p K (q j |a, b i ) involve the same inconsistency. In order to be consistent we must assume throughout that the intervening measurement is made. This entails that instead of the probabilities p (b i |a) the probabilities p (b i |a, Q) must be used in eq. (9), which
One might perceive a contradiction between the counterfactual (A) and my insistence on the necessity of assuming consistently that the intervening measurement is made. But this apparent "contradiction" is the very nature of a counterfactual.
Counterfactuals are statements about conceivable worlds that are different from the actual world in certain specified respects and like the actual world in all other relevant respects. The worlds considered by (A) are different from the actual world in that between t a and t b a measurement is made that is not made in the actual world;
in all other respects they are like the actual world. In particular, the measurements at t a and t b have the specified outcomes. Since (A) is a statement about conceivable worlds in which the Q measurement is made, the probabilities it assigns to the possible outcomes of this measurement must have the same values as the probabilities that we would assign, on the same basis, to the possible outcomes of the same measurement, if this were actually made.
Kastner denies the validity of the counterfactual (A) also on the ground that it allegedly violates the requirement of cotenability. A counterfactual C refers to conceivable worlds that must satisfy two conditions: They must be different from the actual world in certain specified respects, and they must be like the actual world in all other relevant respects. If it turned out that there are no conceivable worlds that satisfy both conditions, C would fail to satisfy this crucial requirement. Before addressing Kastner's argument I will show that both the stability of the background conditions and the laws of nature are in fact respected by (A). The antecedent is the statement that a measurement of observable Q is performed on system S between t a and t b . The background conditions consist in the observation (or the factually warranted possession) of the properties |a a| and |b b| at the respective times t a and t b , as well as in the absence of any measurement between t a and t b other than that specified in the antecedent. The relevant laws of nature are the principles of quantum mechanics. Being statistical laws, they enable us to assign probabilities to the possible results of measurements, and being universal laws that have never been found to conflict with experimental data, they allow us to apply them counterfactually-to assign probabilities to the possible results of unperformed measurements. These assignments can be made on the basis of all relevant facts about either the past or the future properties of S using the Born rule, or on the basis of all relevant facts about the past and future properties of S using the ABL rule. Since both rules are part of standard quantum mechanics, none of these assignments can conflict with standard quantum mechanics. Nor can they conflict with the required stability of background conditions. If obtaining |a a| at t a and |b b| at t b is nomologically possible without interposition of any measurement, the same is nomologically possible whenever a measurement is interposed [20] . The reason this is so is that the interposition of a measurement never decreases the probability of obtaining |b b| at t b given |a a| at t a :
Thus the background conditions are consistent with both the truth and the falsity of the antecedent. And given the necessity of assuming consistently that the intervening measurement is made, the antecedent, conjoined with the relevant laws of nature and the background condition statement, logically entails that the probability of obtaining the value q i is as given by the ABL rule [21].
If Kastner reaches a different conclusion, it is because her understanding of the background conditions and/or of the relevant laws of nature is different from mine.
That she thinks differently about the background conditions is obvious from her discussion [5] of the experiment considered by Sharp and Shanks [7] . In this experiment spin- 1 2 particles are prepared at time t 1 with probability measure |a + and subjected at time t 2 to a measurement of their spin component along the b axis. We are accustomed to read |a + as "spin up along direction a", but what |a + really signifies depends on the time to which it refers. While at t 1 the system possesses the property represented by |a + a + |, for t > t 1 the ket |a + or the density operator W = |a + a + | represents a probability measure that says nothing about properties possessed at t; it only tells us that the prior probability of obtaining the result "spin up along direction c" at the time t is c + |W|c + . By the same token, if the final measurement indicates that the property represented by the operator |b + b + | is possessed at t 2 , then this operator also represents the "time-reversed" density operator By requiring that system S would with certainty have the properties a and b at the respective time t a and t b , Kastner introduces an element of nomological necessity that makes nonsense of (A). What she thereby refutes is not (A) but the following counterfactual (A ′ ), which requires no refutation because it is patently false:
(A ′ ) If a measurement of observable Q were performed on an ensemble of systems between an actually performed measurement of observable A at time t a and an actually performed measurement of observable B at time t b , but no measurement is actually made between t a and t b , then the measurement of Q would yield q i with probability p (q i |a, b), and the measurements of A and B would (with certainty) yield the respective outcomes a and b."
The counterfactual (A) attributes a probability to a possible result of a possible measurement hypothetically performed at time t on an individual system S which (in the actual world) happens to possess the properties a and b at the respective times t a and t b . As has been explained at length in Ref. [2] , nothing ever causes (i) a measurement, qua attempt to determine the value of some observable, to yield a result or (ii) a measurement, qua successful determination of the value of some observable, to take place. In other words, the actual events or states of affairs that indicate the possession of a contingent property (by a system) or of a value (by an observable) are causal primaries, and this not in the sense that nothing ever causes a measurement to yield this particular value rather than that, but in the sense that nothing ever causes a measurement to be successful or to take place. (A causal primary is an event or state of affairs the occurrence or existence of which is not necessitated by any cause, antecedent or otherwise.) What the laws of quantum mechanics encapsulate is statistical correlations between causal primaries. If we take certain measurement results as given, we can use those laws to assign probabilities to the possible results of other measurements, which may or may not be performed.
In particular, we can consider the possession of a (at time t a ) and of b (at time t b ) as given, and use the laws of quantum mechanics to assign probabilities to the possible results of a not actually performed intervening measurement. In so doing we do not assume that the occurrences of the measurements at t a and t b are necessitated by anything, let alone that the respective outcomes a and b are.
The only way to test probability assignments is to determine relative frequencies with the help of appropriately selected ensembles. In the case of (A), the appropriate ensemble is an ensemble of possible worlds in which system S is identically "prepared" or "pre-selected" as well as identically "retropared" or "post-selected,"
and in which the Q measurement is made. Although Kastner introduces one Dr. X † who is "associated with" all of those possible worlds, it is obvious that this ensemble is not empirically accessible. It is possible, however, to reproduce this ensemble in the actual world, by turning it into an ensemble of identically "prepared" and "retropared" copies of S. In order to render testable the probabilities that (A) assigns, we have no choice but to use an ensemble of pre-and post-selected systems. Yet the probabilities that (A) assigns are single-case probabilities; they are assigned to the possible outcomes of a single measurement on a single system that happens to possess property a at time t a and property b at time t b . The selection does not reflect any nomological constraint but merely serves to make those probabilities measurable.
Kastner is committed to denying that counterfactual probability assignments can be tested inasmuch as she considers the probabilities that can be measured (using pre-and post-selected ensembles) to differ quantitatively from the corresponding counterfactual probabilities. Accordingly, she considers statement (A) to be distinct from the following statement:
(B) In a possible world in which observable Q is measured at time t and system S yields outcomes |a a| and |b b| at times t a and t b , respectively, the probability of obtaining result q i is given by p (q i |a, b).
To claim a quantitative difference between counterfactual and non-counterfactual assignments of quantum-mechanical probabilities or a significant difference between statements (A) and (B) is to misunderstand the meaning of counterfactual assignments of quantum-mechanical probabilities. Saying that p (q i |a, b) is the (objective) probability with which q i would be obtained, given the outcomes |a a| and |b b| at the respective times t a and t b , is in all relevant respects exactly the same as saying that p (q i |a, b) is the (subjective) probability with which q i is obtained given the same outcomes at times t a and t b . What else could statement (A) possibly mean?
None of the arguments marshaled by Kastner and the authors cited by her succeed in proving that statement (B) "differs significantly" from statement (A). That the outcome at t b might be different from |b b| if the Q measurement were made,
given the outcome at t a alone, is irrelevant since the outcomes at t a and t b are both given. The argument from cotenability fails because it conflates statements about individual systems with statements about ensembles of systems. The attempt to replace p (q i |a, b) (eq. 6) by p K (q i |a, b) (eq. 8) in (A) and the attempt to show that counterfactual uses of the ABL rule yield consequences that are inconsistent with quantum theory, both fail because they combine expressions that imply that the Q measurement is both performed and not performed. One does not do justice to the counterfactuality of probability assignments by arguments that begin by assuming that Q is not measured and end up by assuming that Q is measured. One does it justice by considering possible worlds in which Q is measured or a suitably pre-and post-selected ensemble of actual-world systems.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES
In this section I want to elucidate the significance of the existence of objective probabilities. Such probabilities are not merely best guesses based on a complete knowledge, and thus free from any element of ignorance; they also tell us something important about the objective world.
To begin with, let us consider the following experiment [24] . A particle initially in possession of the property |ψ 1 ψ 1 | is eventually found in possession of the property |ψ 2 ψ 2 |, where |ψ 1 = (|A + |B + |C )/ √ 3 and |ψ 2 = (|A + |B − |C )/ √ 3. The projection operators P A = |A A|, P B , and P C represent the respective properties of being inside one of three sealed boxes A, B, and C at an intermediate time t. The ABL probability of finding the particle inside box A at the time t is
As it stands, p (A|ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) is underdetermined. To assign to it a value, we still have to specify exactly which observable is being measured. If it is the observable Q whose eigenkets are |A , |B , and |C , the denominator is given by
Since the numerator is equal to 1/9, p (A|ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) is equal to 1/3. If on the other hand we measure the binary observable Q A = P A , the denominator is given by
and p (A|ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) is equal to 1. By the same token, if we measure Q then p (B|ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) = 1/3, and if we measure Q B then p (B|ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) = 1.
I would like to discuss these results in the context of a somewhat more realistic setup. Consider a wall W in which there are three holes A, B and C. In front of the wall there is a particle source E. Behind the wall there is a particle detector D. Both E and D are equidistant from the three holes. Behind C there is a device that causes a phase shift by π. P j now represents the alternative "the particle goes through hole j", where j may also stand for a union like B ∪ C, the opening made up of B and C. For particles emitted by E the prior probability measure (with respect to the time at which they pass the wall) thus is |ψ 1 , and for particles detected by D the posterior probability measure (with respect to the same time) is |ψ 2 . To measure Q A , we place near A a device F A that beeps whenever a particle passes through A.
To measure Q B , we place near B a device F B that beeps whenever a particle passes through B. To measure Q, we use both devices. (If the devices are 100% efficient, the absence of a beep then tells us that the particle went through C.)
What we just found is this: If only F A is in place, the particle goes through A with probability one (assuming, of course, that it is both emitted by E and detected by D). If only F B is in place, the particle goes through B with probability one. If both beepers are in place, the particle is equally likely to go through any of the three holes.
Hence ABL probabilities in general are contextual-they depend on the distinctions that a particular setup permits us to make [25] . By measuring Q we can tell whether the particle goes through A, through B, or through C. By measuring Q A , we can tell whether it goes through A or through B ∪C. With the former setup (both beepers in place) three properties are available for predication-"through A", "through B", and The contextuality of objective ABL probabilities makes it obvious that probability one does not imply actual possession of a value (by an observable) or of a property (by a physical system): From our ability to infer with probability one the result of measuring a physical quantity at time t, it does not follow that at the time t there exists an element of reality corresponding to the physical quantity and having a value equal to the predicted measurement result. Hence the only reason we have for attributing a contingent property q to a physical system or a value v to a quantum-mechanical observable is the occurrence/existence of an actual event or state of affairs from which the possession of q or v can be inferred, or by which it is indicated. In other words, the contextuality of ABL probabilities implies that the contingent properties of physical systems are extrinsic: They supervene on what happens or is the case in the rest of the world. To paraphrase Wheeler [26] , no property is a possessed property unless it is an indicated property. In short, owing to their contextuality, ABL probabilities cannot be assigned without specifying the range of values of an observable that is measured or assumed to be measured; and owing to their extrinsic nature, contingent properties cannot be attributed unless their possession is warranted by facts [27] .
It may be held that, unlike an ABL probability equal to one, a Born probability equal to one is sufficient for the possession of a value [28] , or that an element of reality corresponding to an eigenvalue of an observable Q exists at a time t if the Born probability measure for the time t has the pure form |ψ(t) ψ(t)| and |ψ(t) is an eigenstate of Q. But this is an error. The extrinsic nature of contingent properties can be established without invoking ABL probabilities [2] . The contextuality of ABL probabilities merely confirms it [29] .
Cohen [8] states that in standard quantum mechanics, probabilities for obtaining particular results are not contextual. What he means is that Born probabilities are not contextual. As was shown in Sec. 2, both the Born rule and the ABL rule follow straight from the quantum-mechanical representation of contingent properties as projection operators on a Hilbert space. Both therefore are tools of standard quantum mechanics. Cohen further states that the product rule is always valid in standard quantum mechanics. According to the product rule, if X and Y are commuting observables, if a measurement of X will yield x with Born probability one and a measurement of Y will yield y with Born probability one, then a measurement of XY will yield xy with Born probability one. This too is a statement about Born probabilities, not a statement about standard quantum mechanics. ABL probabilities do not always satisfy the product rule, and therefore standard quantum mechanics does not always satisfy the product rule. The operators Q A = P A and Q B = P B commute; an intervening measurement of Q A would yield 1 ("through A") with probability one; an intervening measurement of Q B would yield 1 ("through B") with probability one; yet a measurement of Q A Q B would yield nothing because (i) Q A Q B = 0 and (ii) there is no world in which Q A Q B can be measured. While Q A is measured in worlds in which only F A is in place, Q B is measured in worlds in which only F B is in place. Hence it is logically impossible for both Q A and Q B to be measured in the same world. What is measured in a world in which both beepers are in place is not Q A Q B but Q. Thus the product rule is "violated" only by combinations of counterfactual statements referring to different possible worlds.
Either type of probability has its specific use. The ABL rule is obviously of no use for predicting, on the basis of data obtained before time t, the result of a measurement performed at the time t, for its application presupposes knowledge of the results of measurements performed after the time t.
[Even if the measurement at the time t is the last measurement ever to be performed on the system, we would have to know this in order to have sufficient information for applying the ABL rule (6) with the trivial property 1 in place of |b b|.] For predictions, we must use the Born rule.
The Born rule, on the other hand, is of little use when it comes to sounding the ontological implications of quantum mechanics, for these must be based on objective probabilities (which are free of any element of ignorance), and such probabilities, as was shown in Sec. 2, are ABL probabilities.
With Mermin [1] I believe that all the mysteries of quantum mechanics can be reduced to the single puzzle posed by the existence of objective probabilities. As I see it, the key to this puzzle is the contingent reality of spatial and temporal distinctions [2] . We are neurophysiologically disposed to think of space as something that exists by itself (rather than by virtue of the relational properties of matter), that contains matter (rather than spatial relations between material objects), and that is intrinsically and infinitely differentiated and thus adequately represented by a set of points that can be labeled by triplets of real numbers [30] . Yet if all conceivable spatial divisions were intrinsic to space, they would have an unconditional reality, and one of the following statements would necessarily be true of every object S contained in the union R ∪ R ′ of two spatial regions: (i) S is inside R; (ii) S is inside R ′ ; (iii) S has two parts, one in R and one in R ′ . No particle could ever pass through the union of two slits without passing through either slit in particular and without consisting of parts that pass through different slits. But this is precisely what particles do when interference fringes are observed in two-slit experiments (and we do not postulate hidden variables). Hence, spatial divisions cannot be intrinsic to space. They have a contingent reality. Like the contingent properties of quantum-mechanical systems, they are extrinsic; they supervene on the actual goings-on in the physical world, and they may be real for one object and nonexistent for another.
It is a fundamental principle of quantum mechanics that the probability of a process P capable of following several alternatives depends on whether or not the alternative taken by the process is indicated or capable of being indicated. If something indicates the alternative taken or if this is capable of being indicated, the probability of the process is given by the sum of the probabilities associated with its alternatives.
By "capable of being indicated" I mean that the alternatives of P are correlated with the alternatives of another process P ′ such that a determination of the alternative taken by P ′ reveals the alternative taken by P. (Paradigm examples of this kind of a situation are the experiments of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [31, 32] and of Englert, Scully, and Walther [33, 34, 35] .) On the other hand, if nothing either indicates or is capable of indicating the alternative taken by the process, the probability of the process is given by the absolute square of the sum of the amplitudes associated with the alternatives. What is the meaning of this fundamental principle?
I submit that if the alternative taken is indicated, we add probabilities because in this case the conceptual distinction that we make between the alternatives has a reality for the process or the system undergoing it-the distinction corresponds to something in the objective world. If the alternative taken is neither indicated nor capable of being indicated, we add amplitudes because in this case the conceptual distinction that we make between the alternatives has no reality for the process or the system undergoing it-the distinction corresponds to nothing in the objective world [36] . In our three-hole experiment it is the presence of F A that makes the spatial distinction between A and B ∪ C a reality for the particle. Assuming the beepers to be 100% efficient [37] , the presence of F A warrants two objective truth values, one for the proposition "The particle goes through A" and one for the proposition "The particle goes through B ∪ C". The existence of these two truth values warrants the reality, for the particle, of the distinction between the two spatial regions A and B ∪ C. The reality of this distinction is the reason why in the denominator of the right-hand side of eq. (13) we add the probabilities associated with the alternatives represented by P A and P B∪C = P B + P C (eq. 15). By the same token, the presence of both beepers warrants objective truth values for three propositions, "The particle goes through A", "The particle goes through B", and "The particle goes through C". The existence of these three truth value warrants the reality, for the particle, of the distinction between the three spatial regions A, B and C. The reality of this distinction is the reason why in the denominator of the right-hand side of eq. (13) we add the probabilities associated with the alternatives represented by P A , P B , and P C (eq. 14).
It needs to be stressed that this explanation of the uncertainty principle-as stated by Feynman and Hibbs [38]: Any determination of the alternative taken by a process capable of following more than one alternative destroys the interference between alternatives-owes nothing to the ABL rule. It rests on the fact that a successful measurement of an observable Q with n eigenvalues warrants attributing n truth values to n propositions, and thus warrants the objective distinctness of the n alternatives. The contextuality of ABL probabilities (as well as Born probabilities [29] ) merely emphasizes the contingent reality of the distinctions we are wont to make. Given two observables with a common eigenvalue q, the ABL probability associated with q in general depends on which of the two observables is being measured-it depends on the entire spectrum of the observable being measured. In particular, the probability of finding that the particle goes through A depends on whether or not our distinction between B and C is objectively warranted (that is, whether or not the measurement is capable of distinguishing between "The particle goes through B" and "The particle goes through C").
The ontological significance of objective probabilities, then, is that they signal the unreality of some of the conceptual distinctions that we make. Since the warranted distinctions depend on what precisely is indicated, so do the probabilities of the corresponding alternatives.
If we conceptually partition space into smaller and smaller regions, we eventually arrive at a partition {R i } into finite (rather than infinitesimal) regions that are so small that the distinctions we make between them have no reality at all [2, 30] . Our spatial distinctions bottom out in a sea of objective probabilities. At a scale at which position-indicators ("detectors") with sufficiently small and sufficiently localized sensitive regions no longer exist, all we can say is counterfactual and probabilistic. This tells us that the world is only finitely differentiated spacewise. Conversely, the limited spatial differentiation of the objective world finds its proper expression in counterfactual assignments of objective probabilities.
What is true of the world's spatial aspect is equally true of its temporal aspect.
There is no such thing as an intrinsically differentiated time, and therefore not only the contingent properties of things but also the times at which they are possessed are extrinsic. What is temporally differentiated is physical systems, and every physical system is temporally differentiated to the extent that it passes through successive states, in the proper sense of "state" that connotes properties indicated by facts.
And since no finite system passes through an infinite number of successive states in a finite time span, no such system is infinitely differentiated timewise. The times that exist for a system S are the (factually warranted) times at which it has (factually warranted) properties [2, 30] .
How, then, are we to conceive of system S during the interval between the times t a and t b ? Since during this interval S lacks factually warranted properties, all that can be said about S between t a and t b is counterfactual and probabilistic. Our conceptual temporal distinctions, too, bottom out in a sea of objective probabilities.
Not only is there no state (in the proper sense just defined) that obtains during this interval, but also there is no time between t a and t b at which any state could obtain.
The importance of this result cannot be overemphasized. It entails that the pa-rameter t appearing in the (prior) Born probability | a(t)|q i | 2 , in the posterior Born probability | q i |b(t) | 2 , and in the ABL probability | a(t)|q i q i |b(t) | 2 / j | a(t)|q j q j |b(t) | 2 cannot be interpreted as the time at which anything obtains per se. The parameter t refers to the time of a measurement. Only if a measurement is actually made does it represent a time that exists for S because only then is there a contingent property that can be attributed to S at the time t. If the measurement is not actually made, the time at which it is made in a possible world does not exist for the actualworld edition of S. It follows in particular that neither the prior probability measure |a(t) nor the posterior probability measure |b(t) nor the ABL probability measure
can be interpreted as something that obtains at the time t [40] . If the measurement is made, what obtains at time t is a result rather than a probability measure, and if the measurement is not actually made, there is no time t at which anything concerning S could obtain.
QUANTUM COUNTERFACTUALS AND THE "FLOW" OF TIME
In this section I want to point out a common but unwarranted assumption about the temporal aspect of the physical world, and I want to show that this assumption leads to the views that Kastner is defending in her Comment [4] . Needless to say, I cannot avow that she actually makes this assumption.
The conclusions we have reached in the previous section run counter to a common way of thinking about time, according to which the experiential now and the temporal distinctions that we base on it are features of the physical world-the world accessible to physics. The experiential now is temporally unextended and undifferentiated. If it did correspond to something in the physical world, this would seem to warrant the notion of an objective instantaneous state that evolves in an infinitely differentiated
time. Yet this contradicts the fact that the world is only finitely differentiated timewise.
In truth, nothing in the physical world corresponds to the experiential now and the temporal distinctions that we base on it. There simply is no objective way to characterize the present or to distinguish between the past, the present, and the future. These distinctions can be characterized only subjectively, by how they relate to us: through memory, through the present-tense immediacy of qualia (introspectible properties like pink or turquoise), or through anticipation. In the world accessible to physics we may qualify events or states of affairs as past, present, or future relative to other events or states of affairs, but we cannot speak of the past, the present, or the future.
In classical physics this is not blindingly obvious. Classical physics is consistent with the notion of an instantaneous state that evolves in an infinitely differentiated time, and that encapsulates not only possessed properties but also everything that time." [42] Yet the non-objectivity of the now remains deeply counterintuitive [43] .
Where space is concerned, we have no difficulty in abstracting from our subjective, perspectival point of view and adopt "the view from nowhere" [44] . Where time is concerned, we find it incomparably more difficult to abstract from our subjective, present-centered point of view and adopt "the view from nowhen" [45] , not least because this seems to conflict with our incorrigible self-perception as free agents, which seems to require an open future [46] .
In the world of physics, the future is as closed as the past. (This follows directly from the non-objectivity of the distinction between the future and the past.) If system S has property |a a| at time t a and property |b b| at time t b , then it always has been and always will be true that system S has these properties at the respective times t a and t b . There is nothing objectively or physically open about this. All that is "open" in respect of this is our knowledge, prior to these times, of the properties possessed at these times. What is (and always has been and always will be) objec-
tively or physically open is the results of unperformed measurements. That is why we can assign to them objective probabilities.
If we retain the fallacious notion of the objectivity of the now and of the temporal distinctions that are based on it, or if we subscribe to the ensuing idea of an evolving instantaneous state, we are committed to regarding system S as infinitely differentiated timewise and to attributing to S a state that obtains at every instant of time. Quantum mechanics offers us not one but three candidates for such a state: the "prepared" or "retarded" state |a(t) , the "retropared" or "advanced" state |b(t) , and the time-symmetric two-state a(t) b(t [7] ,-with the result that the "disturbed" system is necessarily different from the "undisturbed" system either before or after the "disturbance" (or both). This notion implies an apparent infringement of cotenability: The state that obtains before the hypothetical measurement of Q and the state that obtains after this measurement cannot be both independent of the truth value of the antecedent of (A). As Kastner puts it, "holding fixed both pre-and post-selection states" [4] is impossible. If the prepared state |a obtains before the Q measurement at time t then either |a or one of the eigenstates of Q obtains after the time t, depending on whether or not the measurement is made. If the retropared state |b obtains after the time t then either |b or one of the eigenstates of Q obtains before the time t, depending on whether or not the measurement is made [47] . (If one thinks of a b as the state that obtains between t a and t b in the absence of an intervening measurement, an intervening measurement changes both the earlier and the later state: If the measurement yields q i , the former state becomes a q i while the latter state becomes q i b .)
The relevant background conditions, however, are not probability measures, nor are these states that obtain. The relevant background conditions are the possessed properties that determine probability measures. The unmeasured system differs from its possible-world counterpart neither at the times t a and t b (at which times the same properties are possessed in both worlds) nor during the intervals between t a and t and between t and t b (during which intervals no properties are possessed in either world) but only at the time t, which exists for the measured system but not for the unmeasured one. The intervening measurement has no influence whatsoever on what obtains at any other time. It has an influence on some probability measures but none on the relevant probability measures. The relevant probability measures are the prior probability measure |a for times earlier than t and the posterior probability measure |b for times later than t, while what is affected by the intervening measurement is the prior probability measure |a for times later than t and the posterior probability measure |b for times earlier than t. The ABL probability for the time t is obtained by combining, according to Bayes' theorem, the probabilities that are unaffected by the measurement, and thus it is independent of whether or not the measurement is actually performed.
Cohen [8] appears to reject the counterfactual use of the ABL rule not only on the basis of the intrinsically inconsistent eq. (9) but also on the ground that that use is "not consistent with realist interpretations of quantum mechanics." This, however, is no ground for rejecting counterfactual uses of the ABL rule. Rather, it is ground for rejecting realist interpretations of quantum mechanics. By "realist interpretations" Cohen may mean interpretations that endorse either Redhead's sufficiency condition [28] , according to which Born probability one implies the existence of an element of reality, or the so-called "eigenstate-eigenvalue link," according to which "being in" an eigenstate of some observable implies the same. In point of fact, neither does imply the existence of an element of reality [2] . Or else Cohen may mean interpretations that construe probability measures as instantaneous states that evolve in an infinitely differentiated time. Such interpretations involve the double error of (i) treating time-dependent probability measures as if they were actual states and of (ii) extending temporal distinctions beyond the limits within which they are objectively warranted. Is instrumentalism the sole alternative to such realist interpretations? I submit that, on the contrary, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics can be found only when such realist interpretations are rejected. The highlights of that interpretation are the contingent reality of spatial and temporal distinctions and the existence of finite limits to the spatial and temporal differentiation of the physical world.
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